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THE FRENCH JUDICIARY
STATUTORY BASIS
In France as in most continental European countries, the
judiciary is not a constitutional creation. The organization of
the courts, their jurisdiction, the mode of appointment and,
removal of the judges, their qualifications, and their tenure are
all matters which are regulated entirely by statute. The silence
of the present constitution on this, as on so many other matters
customarily dealt with in the fundamental law, is explained in
part by the peculiar circumstances under which it was framed,
and in part by the view which still widely persists in France, that
the judiciary is merely a branch of the executive department.1
This failure to accord the judiciary a place in the constitution as
one of the "great public powers" has called forth many expres-
sions of regret from French writers who complain that the effect
has been to degrade it to the position of a fonction whereas it
should be regarded as a grande pouvoir, to reduce it to a state of
dependence upon the executive power, and to diminish the great
r6le which it should play in the life of the state.2 This depend-
ence is one reason why, we are told, the French judiciary has
never asserted or exercised the right to declare unconstitutional
acts of the legislature null and void.
3
Some French commentators, however, argue that the silence
of the present constitution in respect to the judiciary is no proof
that it was intended to be regarded as merely a branch of the
executive power, and they point out that in most of the earlier
constitutions of France it was in fact treated as one of the great
departments, usually a separate chapter or title being devoted to
1 Compare on .this point Dehesdin, Le recruitement et Pavancement des
magistrats, p. vi; Larnaude (REVUE DES IND-ES May 15, I905) ; Berth6lemy,
Droit administratif (6th ed.) p. 12, who regards the judiciary as a branch
of the executive power; Esmein, Droit constitutionnel (5th ed.) p. 17,
who adopts the contrary view. Generally the administrative jurists reject
the tripartite theory.
2 Compare on this point the observations of Coumoul in his Traiti du
pouvoir judiciaire, chaps. i, iii, and vi.
3 See my article on Judicial Control of Legislative and Administrative




the pouvoir judiciaire.4  It seems quite clear that the reason
why the authors of the present constitution neglected the
judiciary is to be found, as stated above, in the peculiar circum-
stances under which they sat and in the belief that their work
should be restricted to the preparation of a provisional instrument
dealing mainly with the organization of the executive and legis-
lative powers, and the defining of their relations.5
II
UNITY OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Another distinguishing characteristic ofFrench judicial organ-
ization is to be found in what the French call the unity of civil
and criminal justice. This does not mean that civil and criminal
actions are tried according to the same rules of procedure, but
that the same courts which hear and determine civil actions also
try criminal cases. The desirability of separate courts for the
trial of criminal and civil cases has never commended itself to
the French in the same degree that it has to the English, or even
to the Americans. It is true that the superior courts are divided
into civil and criminal chambers, as is the custom generally on
the continent, but these chambers are not regarded as separate
courts but merely subdivisions of the same tribunal. Thus, the
court of assizes, which tries crimes, is not an independent autono-
mous court, but a special organ constituted from the personnel
of the court of appeal. So the tribunal of correction for the
trial of misdemeanors and less important crimes is a branch of
the civil tribunal of first instance.
On the other hand, there has existed in France for a long time
a separate and distinct set of tribunals for the determination of
administrative controversies; that is to say, controversies arising
between the administrative authorities and private individuals.
As is well known, the theory of administrative jurisdiction origi-
nated at the time of the Revolution and was founded on the desire
of the Revolutionists to free the administrative authorities from
4 Compare Marchand, Le recruitement de Ia magistrature, pp. 26, 31;
Coumoul, op. cit., chap. iii.
5 Some authorities consider the question to be of academic interest
merely; they contend that in fact the judiciary is as independent of the
government as it would be if it were a constitutional creation, unless, of
course, the system of popular election were adopted.
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the control of the judicial tribunals, the judges of which were
suspected of hostility to the reforms introduced in consequence
of the Revolution.6  At first, administrative controversies were
heard and determined by the administrative authorities, but, in
time, there grew up a distinct system of administrative courts
by the side of the judicial courts, and this system remains to-day,
notwithstanding the fact that the particular danger which the
law of i79o was designed to meet (the hostility of the judges
to the Revolutionary reforms) has long since disappeared. The
two systems of courts are entirely separate and independent each
of the other; each has its own organization, its own judges, and
its own jurisdiction, and questions involving conflicts of jurisdic-
tion between them are determined by a special tribunal of
conflicts.
III
LOCALIZATION OF THE COURTS
Another feature of French judicial organization which forms
an interesting contrast to the English and American systems is
found in the sedentary character of the French courts; that is
to say, they always sit in the same place, Thus, each court of
appeal sits in the chief town of the district, each tribunal of first
instance sits in the chef lie% of the arrondissement, etc. The
French judges never go on circuit from one town to another, as
is common in England and America. Every court has its perma-
nent seat and litigants must come to it. There was considerable
sentiment at the time of the Revolution in favor of introducing
the English system of circuit judges (juges ambulantes) but on
this proposition, as on others, the "Anglicans" were out-voted.
Proposals have been made at different times in recent years to
reduce the number of tribunals of first instance (there are now
359), and require the judges of those which remain to go on
circuit and hold court in different parts of the larger districts
which it has been proposed to create, but as yet the opposition to
the scheme has prevented its adoption.7  The judges themselves
6 The origin of the administrative jurisdiction is discussed by the writer
in an article on Judicial Control of Administrative and Legislative Acts
in France, loc. cit., and by Duguit, The French Administrative Courts,
29 POL. Scr. QuART. pp. 386, 388.
7 See Picot, La riforine judiciaire, p. 436. Such a proposal was con-
tained in a judicial reorganization bill introduced in J915 by M. Viviani,
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have strongly opposed the suggestion because, among other rea-
sons, it would compromise the dignity of the magistracy, and
expose the judges to additional expense and inconvenience s
IV
COLLEGIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS
Still another feature of French judicial organization which
distinguishes it from that of England and the United States is
the system of pluralitM des juges. All the French courts, except
those held by the justices of the peace, are collegial in organiza-
tion; that is, they are held by several magistrates. Thus the
tribunals of first instance are composed of from three to fifteen
judges; the court of assizes of three judges (a president and
two assessors); the courts of appeal, of at least five judges,
called councillors (until 1883, at least seven) ; and the Court of
Cassation by forty-nine councillors. In France no judgment is
valid (except those of the courts of the justices of the peace)
unless it is rendered by at least three judges. The idea.of a court
held by a single judge, which Bentham so strongly recommended,
has never gained a firm foothold in France. There the view of
Montesquieu, that "there is no place for a single judge in any but
despotic states" has been dominant. Juge unique, juge inique,
runs an old French proverb. Throughout all the periods of
French history the notion has persisted that to a certain extent
the authority of a judgment is in proportion to the number of
judges who render it. Plurality of judges, says Coumoul, one
of the most highly respected French magistrates and writers on
the judiciary, is an essential of good justice. This principle, he
adds, existed during the ancien rigime and the reformers of
I79O found no fault with it. It increases, he argues, the safe-
guards against arbitrariness, enables the courts to resist more
effectively the influence of the public prosecutor and the pressure
of the government, is more in accord with the habits and mental
minister of justice. Dufaure, prime minister in 1876, advocated this reform
as a means of reducing the excessive number of judges.8 Dehesdin, op. cit., p. 474; Picot, op. cit., p. 288. Dehesdin points out
that the system has no such results in England where the sheriff meets
the judge upon his arrival, in red robe and livery, and accompanies him
with coach and four to the quarters reserved for his lodging and
entertainment.
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aptitudes of the Latin race, and adds dignity and solemnity to
the trial.' But there have always been adversaries in France of
the system of pluralit. The question was discussed in Parlia-
ment as early as 183o, and a breach in the system was actually
made when the number of assessors of the court of assizes was
reduced from four to two. Nearly half a century ago the
principle of a single judge for the inferior courts was advocated
by the great orator and advocate, Odillon Barrot, who denounced
as false the notion that the value of a judgment is in proportion
to the number of judges who render it. M. Barrot also pointed
out that plurality destroys responsibility.'0
In recent years there has been a lively discussion of the sub-
ject in France and the sentiment in favor of a single judge for
the lower courts is undoubtedly increasing, but it can hardly be
said to be general. Among the leading advocates of the pro-
posed change is M. Cruppi, a former minister of justice and a
prominent Parisian advocate. Whatever may be the number of
judges, whether three or twenty, says M. Cruppi, there is usually
one who dictates the judgment without taking the responsibility.'"
The extension of the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace by
an act of Parliament in 19o5 would seem to indicate that the old
distrust of justice administered by a single magistrate is to some
9Traiti du pouvoir judiciaire, pp. 371, 385. Compare also Picot, op. cil.,
p. 241, who remarks that the idea of a single judge is dangerous. Cruppi,
La Cour d'Assises, p. 147, quotes a French observer who was struck by
the lack of solemnity which characterized a trial by a single judge,. which
he attended at the Old Bailey in London.
10 See his book, De rorganisation judiciaire, p. 69.
"See his book, La Cour d'Assises, p. 145. In i9o6 M. Cruppi in his
report on the budget of the ministry of justice advocated the substitution
of a single judge for the tribunals of first instance. It was again advo-
cated by the reporter of the budget of the ministry of justice in igog. The
late Professor Raymond Saleilles of the University of Paris, one of the
most distinguished publicists of France, was also an advocate of this
reform. BuLL znT DE LA soCIErA GtNADAL.E DES PRISONS (1903) P. 993.
Still another advocate of the proposed change is the well-known criminolo-
gist, M. Loubat, procureur-ghntrale at Lyons. The notion that plurality of
judges increases the safeguards of the accused, M. Loubat repudiates,
and he cites the celebrated cases of Thou, Valette, Cinq Mars, and the
duc d'Enghein as evidence that the system of plurality is not necessarily
a safeguard against judicial despotism. See his article entitled, Les ides
de E. Faguet sur la justice moderne, 72 Ray. POL. Er PaRL. p. 258. See
also a similar line of argument by M. Julien Lef~vre in an article entitled,
Le premier acte de la r~forme judiciaire, 69 Rav. POL. zT PARL. especially,
pp. 483-484
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extent disappearing. It may also be remarked that the important
judicial functions of referee in Paris are performed by a single
magistrate. Finally, it is well known that although the court of
assizes is held by three judges the trial is in fact conducted by the
president of the court, his two colleagues being merely silent spec-
tators.12  In 1907 M. ,Cruppi, then minister of justice, brought
in a bill providing that all courts of first instance should be held
by a single judge. In the expos6 des motifs which accompanied
the bill, it was argued that the system of plurality of judges was
not necessarily a guarantee of justice; that the assessors were
often mere automata, being dominated by the presiding judge;
and that it tended to destroy responsibility. 3 The bill, however,
was not favorably received. In the debates-of 1910-I912 on the
juvenile court bill, many members favored a single judge for the
proposed court; it was advocated by Senator B6renger and
other juvenile court reformers and was recommended by the
senate committee to which the bill had been referred. But the
old prejudice against trials by a single judge asserted itself, and
the court as finally provided for consists of a chamber constituted
out of the tribunal of first instance.
In 1915, M. Viviani, then minister of justice, brought in a bill
providing for the substitution of a single judge in the tribunals
of first instance and in the courts of assizes, except that in grave
cases the judge was to be allowed to call in a colleague in a
purely advisory capacity. But it was not passed by either
chamber.
The personnel of the magistracy is still further augmented by
a small army of supplementary judges (juges suppliants), for
which provision appears to have been first made in i83o."' The
number attached to each tribunal of first instance varies from one
to six, except in the case of the tribunal of the Seine, where
there are twenty. The total number in France is over 8oo. They
12 See my article on Criminal Procedure in France, 25 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, especially, p. 262. Nevertheless, the two assessors deliberate
with the presiding judge and have a vote in fixing the sentence.
1324 REV. DE Dvorr PUB. p. 348. Judge Coumoul, however, criticizes the
proposal. See his Pouvoir judiciaire, p. 376.
14In i8o8 Napoleon created a body of auditor judges. They were
stagiary magistrates charged with conducting examinations, interroga-
tories, and other preparatory judicial functions. They were abolished in
i83o, however, and provision made for supplementary judges. Malepeyre,
La magistrature en France, p. 95.
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have a consultative voice in the deliberations of the tribunal to
which they are attached and a vote whenever they take the place
of a judge whose presence is necessary to the validity of a judg-
ment.15  They are young magistrates-d~butants-and as a
body they serve as a sort of recruiting ground for the higher
magistracy.18 About one-third of the total number receive a
small salary ($3oo a year); the rest receive nothing. Their
future is not assured, for after serving four or five years without
salary they not infrequently see others promoted over them
through political favoritism. So unpromising is their future that
in recent years the number of applicants has been far below the
number of vacancies. The abolition of the supplementary judge
has frequently been proposed in recent years.' 7
V
THE EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF JUDGES
As a result of the large number of tribunals and courts, 8 their
collegial organization, and the system of supplementary judges,
the judicial personnel of France is extraordinarily large, and
forms a striking contrast to that of England, where the total
number of judges of all kinds scarcely exceeds one hundred.' 9
15 Bonfils, Traiti tlimentaire d'organization judiciaire, de compitence et
de procidure, etc., p. 13.
2G Picot, op. cit., p. 307.
'7 Cf. Rengade, La magistrature et la dfmocratie, 79 REv. POL. Er PAsL.
p. 498; Loubat, 72 ibid., p. 26o.
18 In France the inferior judicial bodies are designated as "tribunals,"
the term court (cour) being reserved for the higher jurisdictions, such as
the courts of assizes, courts of appeal, and the Court of Cassation. The
titularies of the "tribunals" are called judges (fuges) ; those of the courts,
councillors (conseillers).
19 The English master of judicial statistics in a letter of April 16, 19o3,
addressed to Hon. Joseph H. Choate, then American ambassador to Great
Britain, stated that twenty-three judges sitting at London handled all the
litigation of England and Wales with a total population of 32,500,000. See
Report of the New York Commission on the Laws Delays, pp. 76, io6.
This statement remarkable enough does not appear, however, to be quite
true. In fact, the judicial force of England consists of twenty judges of
the King's Bench, about sixty recorders in the larger towns and cities, the
justices of the peace in the counties (the number of which in some
counties is very large, but the actual duties of which are performed by a
small number of magistrates), the Master of the Rolls, and five Lords
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Odillon Barrot, the leader of the French bar half a century ago,
complained that the number of judges in France was even then
excessive, being far greater than the judicial needs of the country
required. According to him, the number of magistrates in 1872
was as follows: 2,939 justices of the peace; 2,968 judges of first
instance; 780 councillors of the courts of appeal and of the Court
of Cassation; a total of 6,687.
To this it was necessary to add I,O36 members of the minist&e
publique (attorneys-general, prosecuting attorneys, etc.) mak-
ing a total of 7,723 members of the sitting and standing magis-
tracies.20
In 1883 the magistracy underwent an puration in consequence
of which there was a slight reduction in the personnel, but since
then there have been some augmentations, so that it is safe to say
that there are still between five and six thousand judges, not
counting the members of the standing magistracy.
Everybody in France to-day admits that this number is exces-
sive, and successive ministers of justice in recent years have urged
a reduction. Judicial reformers and, writers for the past seventy-
five years have dwelt upon the evil. Benjamin -Constant, leader
of the Liberal party during the periods of the Restoration and
the July monarchy, advocated such a reform.21 So did Odillon
Barrot, 2 Jules Favre,23 Pr6vost-Paradol, 24 the duc de Broglie,25
justices of the court of appeal (in addition to the presidents of the
three divisions of the High Court); and a sergeant and two judges of
the Court of the City of London. In 19o7 a court of criminal appeal was
created, but it is held by judges of the King's Bench Division of the High
Court. There are also four Lords of Appeal in ordinary, who exercise
the judicial functions of the House of Lords, and there is the judicial
committee of the Privy Council, but their members are peers rather than
members of the regular judiciary. See Lowell, The Government of
England, Vol. II, chap. lx; and Lawson and Keedy, Criminal Procedure in
England, i Amma. JouR. OF CPim. LAW AND CRImINOLOGY, pp. 599, 763 ff.
20 The French divide the magistracy into two parts: the sitting magis-
tracy, composed of the judges of the tribunals and the councillors of the
higher courts; and the standing magistracy, which consists of the pro.
cureurs, procureurs-giniraux, avocats-giniraux, etc. Jules Favre, in his
De la riforme judiciaire, p. 37, estimated the total number of sitting
magistrates in France and Algeria at 5,444.
21 Cours de, politique constitutionelle, Vol. I, p. 154.
22 De l'organisation judiciaire, pp. 13, 67, 68.
2 3De la riforme judiciaire, pp. 37, 112 ff.
24 La France nouvelle, p. 2oi.
25 Vues sur le gouvernement, p. 142.
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and Gambetta during the early days of the present Republic.
More recently the need of this reform has been urged by a host
of well-known writers on the judiciary.28
It is especially the tribunals of first instance that are the objects
of attack. It will be remembered that there is one such tribunal
for each of the administrative arrondissements-359 altogether
-and each tribunal is composed of from three to fifteen judges,
to say nothing of the staff of recorders, procureurs, avougs,
huissiers, etc., attached to each. Some of these arrondissements,
particularly those situated in the mountainous regions of eastern
and southeastern France, are sparsely settled, and their tribunals
have little business to occupy their time.2 7  In a goodly number
of them the tribunals actually handle less than one hundred
cases a year.
2 8
Many proposals have been made in and out of Parliament since
1876 for a reduction of the judicial personnel either through the
substitution of a single judge in the tribunals of first instance,
or through the abolition of those tribunals which are least occu-
pied with business. Reporters of the judicial budget and even
ministers of justice themselves year after year have advocated
one or the other of these proposals.2 9  M. Viviani, minister of
justice in 1915, introduced and advocated a bill providing for a
substantial reduction through the abolition of the system of plu-
rality in the lower courts; the suppression of more than one-half
26 Notably by Picot, La riformne judiciaire, p. 264; Malepeyre, Le re-
cruitement de la -magistrature, pp. 6, 238; Cruppi, La Cour d'Assises,
chap. iv; Dehesdin, La recruitement et 'avancement des magistrats. pp.
155, 467; Le Fevre, 69 REv. POL. Er PARL. pp. 479 ff.
27 Malepeyre, op. cit., p. 6, speaks of tribunals "completely unoccupied"
and he adds that it is "debasing to the character of a judge to occupy a
salaried post which requires no work." For the same view see Picot,
op. cit., 266.
28 Picot writing in i881 stated that there were 98 tribunals which decided
less than ioo cases a year, and that there were 102 others that judged
between ioo and i5o only. Op. cit., p. 265. Dehesdin states that during
the year i9o8 the tribunal of Nyons tried only 65 cases; that of Florac,
only 74; that of Villefranche, only 71; that of Barcellonette, only 52;
that of Castellane, only 34. Op. cit., p. 468.
29 The reporter of the budget of the ministry of justice in 909 pro-
tested against the excessive number of judges and declared it to be a
disgrace that courts were maintained which handled less than one hundred
cases a year. The complaint was reaffirmed in 1911. Ch. des Deps. (1912)
No. i87o, p. 2.
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of the 359 tribunals of first instance; and the reduction of the
number of councillors of the courts of appeal from five to three8 0
The proposal to reduce the judicial personnel through the
substitution of the system of a single judge has been opposed for
reasons stated above. The proposal to abolish -the "unoccupied"
tribunals has encountered opposition from various quarters. In
the first place, those which handle the fewest number of cases
are in the mountainous regions of eastern and southeastern
France where the railway facilities are the poorest and where, in
consequence, the seat of the tribunal is often twelve or fifteen
hours distant from the remote parts of the district. To abolish,
therefore, these tribunals and require litigants to take their cases
to the tribunal of a neighboring district or to the seat of the
dipartement in case one tribunal only should be retained for each
such circumscription, would impose a great hardship upon those
who are least able to bear it.31 In the second place, the local
opposition to the abolition of a tribunal, the presence of which
with its galaxy of judges, procurators, solicitors, advocates, etc.,
adds much to the importance and prestige of the town in which
it sits, has heretofore been one of the chief obstacles to the
realization of this much-needed reform. These towns are very
jealous of their local pride, and the suppression of their tribunal
would seriously wound their amour propre.32  Every such pro-
posal, therefore, is vigorously combated by the local member of
Parliament. We in the United States know well how difficult
it has been to get rid of useless customs districts, army posts,
navy yards, and the like, because of the opposition of the locali-
30The number of the courts of appeal (there are twenty-seven) might
also be reduced through the abolition of those least occupied and the con-
solidation of others, for example, those at Chamb6ry, Bastia, Agen,
Besangon, Poitiers, Nimes, Toulouse, Dijon, and Rouen, most of which
handle less than one hundred cases each. Cf. Dehesdin, op. cit., p. 475;
Favre, op. cit., p. I 4.
31 Cf. Picot, Op. cit., p. 274.
32 Compare a speech of the minister of justice in the Senate, June ig,
1914, JOURNAL OFFIMcL, p. 752. A provincial deputy speaking on such a
proposal in 1849 remarked that, "Paris might easily spare a few magis-
trates; that they were scarcely noticeable by one who visited the art
galleries, museums, libraries, etc., but to mutilate the magistracy of a
poor provincial town would be to extinguish these modest foyers from
which radiate some streams of knowledge. What would be left? Silent
streets, deserted squares, and a population whose only star had been put
out." Quoted by Picot, op. cit., p. 274.
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ties affected and of their representatives in Congress. The
problem of abolishing useless courts and judges in France has
been complicated by similar difficulties. The French deputies
are generally agreed that there should be a substantial reduction,
but when it is proposed to apply the remedy in a particular place
the opposition at once asserts itself.
Finally, the abolition of any considerable number of courts
would entail large expense to the state on account of the neces-
sity of providing pensions for the judges thus legislated out of
office, and of indemnifying the solicitors, recorders, and other
ministerial court functionaries who, in consequence of the surviv-
ing remnant of the old system of venaliti, have a property right




All judges in France from the highest to the lowest, except
the members of the councils of prud'Jmmes and the commercial
tribunals,33 are appointed by the President of the Republic, which
means in fact appointment by the minister of justice. In 179o,
however, the Revolutionists introduced the system of popular
election in consequence of the doctrines of popular sovereignty
and the separation of powers which were then dominent. The
results of the first elections, which took place in 179o, were not
disappointing, at least in Paris, and a number of well-qualified
and even distinguished jurists were chosen, among them Tron-
chet, Thouret, Tr6tean, Merlin, Treilhard, Duport, and Herault
de S6chelles, who constituted the 61ite of the Parisian juriscon-
suIts. 34 The electors, however, manifested- a distressing indiffer-
ence, hardly more than one-sixth of them participating in the
election.3 5  With the establishment of the Republic and the
ascendancy of the popular party, the judges elected in 179o fell
under suspicion and were denounced by some of the Radicals
33 The former are chosen by an electorate composed of employers and
employees; the latter by an electorate consisting of certain categories of
persons representing the business and commercial interests.
34 Dehesdin, op. Cit., p. 32 The results in the provinces, however, were
less satisfactory; cf. Seligman, Justice pendant la Revolution, p. 357.
25 Picot, op. cit., p. 27. In Paris scarcely more than 3oo electors voted,
but Picot adds that they constituted the "te of the electorate."
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like Danton as being disloyal aristocrats and docile instruments
of despotism who were hostile to the principles of the Revolu-
tion.36 The demand for an ipuration of the magistracy was
accordingly made and new elections were ordered by the National
Assembly to be held in 1793 before the expiration of the terms of
the sitting judges.
At the same time the tax-paying qualification for voting was
abolished and even bankrupts and insolvents were made electors.
Likewise all qualifications for eligibility to the magistracy were
removed and every citizen twenty-five years of age, who was
not a servant or a beggar, was declared eligible to election, so
great was the hostility to what Danton characterized as the
"revolting aristocracy of the men of law." The results of the
election of 1793 were deplorable. The election was marked by
the fiercest political passion and the mediocrity of the judges
elected, says Picot, was only equalled -by their obscurity. Only
three of the distinguished magistrates chosen in i79o were
re-elected and of the fifty-one judges and suzpplgants chosen in
Paris, only three were lawyers. Among those elected were
engravers, stonecutters, clerks, laborers, and gardeners, and some
were without any profession at all.3 7  As in I79o the indif-
ference of the electors was deplorable31 The public had no
confidence in such a magistracy and litigants generally preferred
to settle their disputes by arbitration.
Napoleon put an end to the system of popular election. At
first he retained it for the choice of justices of the peace but
even as to these it was a failure, 39 and, after a brief experiment
(i8o2-i8o4) with the system of presentation by the electors,
Napoleon in i8o4 abolished the last remnant of the system of
popular election, and substituted the method of appointment by
the executive, a method which has been continued without inter-
ruption until now.
3 6 Douarche, 46 REv. POL. ET PARL. pp. 138-139.
37 Picot, op. cit., p. 30. Laboulaye, La parti liberale, p. 231; Brissaud,
Historie de droit frangais public (Eng. trans. by Garner) p. 561; Male-
peyre, op. cit., chap. iii; Marchand, op. cit., p. 5I.
38 One judge was chosen by eighteen votes. The tribunal at Merlun was
elected by thirty-one voters. Malepeyre, op. cit., p. 217; Dehesdin, op. cit.,
p. 34.
3 Everywhere the justices of the peace were declared to be incompetent
In some cities, notably Aix-Marseilles, most of them were common
laborers.
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The unhappy results of this early experience with an elective
judiciary greatly discredited the system and from then until now
there has been no widespread demand for its reintroduction. In
1848, there was some agitation in favor of a return to popular
-election, but the commission appointed by the National Assembly
to study and report on the question of judicial reorganization
repudiated it.40 In the National Assembly which framed the
present constitution a few members like B6renger, Goblet and
Dufaure advocated the recruitment of the magistracy by exami-
nation as in Germany, but there appears to have been little or
no sentiment in favor of popular election. During the parlia-
mentary debate of 1882-83 on the reorganization of the judiciary
a few members, of which Georges Clemenceau was the leader,
advocated a return to the system of popular election. They
argued that it was more in accord with the theories of popular
sovereignty and the separation of powers; that the people were
as competent to choose judges as they were to elect members of
parliament; that they had demonstrated in 179o their capacity
to elect able magistrates; that they were then electing the com-
mercial judges and councillors of prud'hommes5l against which
no complaints had been made; and, finally, they invoked the
examples of Switzerland and the United States.42  Clemenceau
and his supporters were answered by M. Humbert, minister of
40 Dehesdin, op. cit., p. 33.
41 Who, says Jules Favre, handled nearly half the litigation of France.
Riforme judiciaire, p. 29.
42 Clemenceau in his speech of Jan. 22, 1883, denounced the system of
appointment by the minister of justice as one which introduced politics
into the judiciary and impaired the independence of the judges. "What
confidence may we have in appointment by the government," he asked,
"when we speak of the incapacity of the people? I return upon the keeper
of the seals [the minister of justice] and ask him from whence he derives
his capacity? It is to his portfolio that I address this question and the
portfolio does not answer. But what does the keeper of the seals when
he wishes to appoint a judge? He consults his bureaus-his bureaus which
contain good recommendations of good deputies, good recommendations of
good senators, good journalists, good functionaries, and good magistrates
who tend naturally to perpetuate nepotism in their corporation. Then he
makes a trial of these recommendations. This or that one is a friend of
an influential man; it is necessary to disarm this one in order to gain the
support of that one. It is in this way that judges are appointed whom the
minister does not know and whom the bureaus do not know." Quoted by
Dehesdin, op. cit., p. iog. Other statesmen who advocated popular election
were Jules Simon and Jules Favre.
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justice, Waldeck-Rousseau and others who dwelt on the disastrous
results which attended the system of popular election between
179o and i8oo, who asserted that the argument from Swiss and
American experience was inconclusive because of the widely
different conditions and the different mental and moral aptitudes
of the French people; that popular election would endanger
republicanism in the regions of the west where the monarchists
were in the majority; that it would introduce politics into the
administration of justice; and would destroy the unity of juris-
prudence because justice in some communities would, under a
system of popular election, be administered in accordance with
local customs and ideas.4 3 For the moment the advocates of
popular election triumphed, and the Chamber of Deputies passed
a bill providing for the election of the judges by the people,
but upon reconsideration it later rescinded its action by a small
majority. For a time after 1883 the question continued to be
agitated and a flood of books and pamphlets designed to influence
public opinion followed, but in recent years interest in the matter
has declined and there is now no general demand for popular
election. Of the various political parties and groups in France,
the only one which advocates popular election is the Radical
Party." The prevailing view held in France has been thus
stated by a well-informed student of the question:
"Because popular election works well in Switzerland and
the United States is no argument for introducing it in
France. The French have neither the wise toleration of
the Swiss nor the practical spirit of the Americans. We
pass easily from one extreme to the other and we often
despair of institutions and men to whom we have accorded
the greatest confidence."4 5
A mode of selection that has been widely advocated in France
43The debates are summarized in Dehesdin, op. cit., pp. l02-ii.
44See the platform of this party in Charpentier, Le parti radical et
radical socialiste, 19o-i91r, p. 263; Buisson, La politique radicale, p. i79.
45 Marchand, Le recruitement de la magistrature en France, p. 95;
cp. also Desjardin, Questions sociales et politiques, La magr. 6lue; Picot,
op. cit., p. 328; Coumoul, op. cit., p. 305, who remarks that popular election
is more in accord with a republican constitution but that it is not practic-
able under existing conditions. A judge, says Coumoul, cannot be im-
partial in the presence of electors, some of whom are his supporters and
others his adversaries. Besides, a judge must possess qualities which do
not appeal to the electors.
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and which is apparently the most favored by the partisans of judi-
cial reform, is that of appointment by the executive from a list
of candidates presented by the court in which the vacancy occurs,
or from a list presented by the magistracy and the bar. The
latter method of appointment was proposed by the commission on
judicial reform of the National Assembly of 1848. A system of
presentation by the courts was proposed by the commission on
judicial reform in 1871 and a bill embodying this scheme was
introduced and advocated by Jules Favre in 1877.48 Prior to
i9o6 the customary procedure in making appointments to the
bench was as follows: whenever a vacancy occurred, the presi-
dent and the procureur-g6nrale of the court in which it took
place presented a list of two or three candidates to the minister
of justice who was of course free to make the selection from the
list thus presented or not as he pleased. In fact he frequently
did not, but instead appointed a candidate recommended by the
deputy from the district, especially if the latter were a politician
of influence and a political supporter of the government.
The influence exerted by the politicians and especially by mem-
bers of parliament in the appointment of judges has long been a
subject of widespread complaint and protest. There have always
been some, however, who have inveighed against the practice.
M. Briand, minister of justice in 1912, declared that the judges
had become the prey of politicians. He denounced their interfer-
ence in the appointment and promotion of magistrates and
pleaded with his colleagues to renounce this "dangerous confu-
sion of powers."
In recent years there has been a considerable demand in
France for the creation of a judicial novitiate such as exists in
Germany47 and other continental countries, appointments to
which shall be made on the basis of examination after a more
extended study of law, and from which the higher positions in the
46 On the method of presentation see Picot, op. cit., p. 334; Favre,
op. cit., p. io8; de Broglie, Vues sur le gouverneinent de la France, p. 151.
Pr~vost-Paradol in his La France nouvelle, p. i66, advocated a mixed
system of presentation by the judiciary and the local elective assemblies.
This system had the support of Odillon Barrot, Senators B~renger and
Goblet, and Judge Picot. More recently it has been advocated by the
General Society of Prisons. REVUE PENITENTIARE (go6) p. 987.
47 Where appointments to the magistracy are made only after examina-
tion and from candidates who have spent three years in the law faculty of
a German university.
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magistracy shall be recruited.48  In obedience to this sentiment
Parliament enacted in I9o6 that, until an organic law on the
subject had been passed, the professional qualifications for eligi-
bility to the magistracy should be determined by an ordinance
(r~glement) issued by the President of the Republic, and that a
table of promotions (tableau d'avancement) should be estab-
lished, with a view to introducing the merit system in the method
of appointments and promotions, thereby diminishing the evils
of appointments of judges without sufficient legal training, upon
the recommendations of politicians.
In pursuance of the authority granted by the law of i9o6 a
decree was promptly issued by the Sarien ministry 9 providing
that in the future no one should be appointed to the magistracy
who had not passed an examination, unless he was a member of
the council of state, a member of the colonial magistracy, a
member of a prefectoral council, a functionary of four years'
standing in the ministry of justice, an advocate of ten years'
standing, a recorder, an ex-magistrate, a solicitor (avoU6), ajustice of the peace of two years' standing, -and a few others.
Permission to take the examination had to be obtained from the
minister of justice and he was free to withhold it for any reason
which seemed to him sufficient. The decree of i9o6 marked an
important step in the direction of restricting the discretion of the
minister of justice, and of eliminating 'the abuse of political
appointments and promotions; but it was strongly attacked both
in and out of Parliament for various reasons, the chief of which
was that it exempted' from the examination requirement too
many public officials, and left too much discretion in the hands of
48 Such a system was in fact introduced by Dufaure in the colonial
magistracy in 1876 with good results but it fell into desuetude because itlimited the power of appointment of the minister of justice. It appears,
however, to have been revived in i9o5. During the periods of the First
Empire and the Restoration (18o4-i83o) there was a corps of auditors
attached to the courts which constituted a sort of p4tpinijre for the recruit-
ment of the magistracy and it has been highly praised by some writers(e. g., Picot) but it was abolished in i83o and the system of suppliantjudges took its place. Between 1838 and I842 a long debate took place
in Parliament on the question of establishing a judicial novitiate and it
was strongly favored by great jurists like Portalis. In I875 Dufaure
established a system of examination for appointments to the position of
substitute judge and the results are said to have been good, but it was
soon abandoned for the system of political appointments.
49 Text in Dehesdin, op. cit., pp. 476-484.
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the minister of justice.50 The decree was therefore revoked and
a new one issued in its place in 19o8. This decree substituted a
pass examination (examen) in the place of a competitive exam-
ination (concurs), increased the stagiaire requirement, and aug-
mented the list of subjects on which candidates are examined,
but at the same time it enlarged the exempt class to include vari-
ous functionaries not exempted by the decree of 19o6. The




During the old regime, at least after the system of venaliti
had become an established practice, the tenure of the judges was
permanent. He who had bought his judgeship could not be
removed; otherwise judicial offices would have found no pur-
chasers. The Revolutionists, however, introduced along with
popular election the system of short tenures.52  With the intro-
duction by Napoleon of the system of executive appointment,
the tenures of all judges except justices of the peace were made
permanent, and -they were declared to be irremovable, although
Kiapoleon, in fact, did not respect scrupulously the principle thus
proclaimed.53  The charters of 1814 and 183o proclaimed the
principle of irremovability, and the disregard of it by the crown
was the subject of frequent protest by the Liberals who took the
position that appointment by the crown unaccompanied by per-
manence of tenure would reduce the judges to a position of sub-
serviency. The principle of irremovability was also proclaimed
by the constitutions of 1848 and 1852, and by the senatus con-
sultum of 1870. The present constitution, as already stated, con-
tains no provisions regarding the judiciary, but the judicial
reorganization act of 1883 reaffirms the principle which some
publicists regard as having become a well-established constitu-
tional rule.54 The judges, therefore, cannot be removed by the
50 See Dehesdin, op. cit., p. 452; Marchand, op. cit., p. 167 and Demartial,
La nomination des magistrats, 52 REv. POL. ET PARL. p. 88
51 Cf. Marchand, op. cit., p. I86.
52 Justices of the peace were elected for two years, judges of the
tribunals of first instance for six years, and councillors of the Court of
Cassation for four years.
53 Cf. Marchand, op. cit., p. 27.
54 Molliet, Le pouvoir hierarchique, p. 85.
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President of the Republic, or the minister of justice, but it would
seem that they may be legislated out of office under the guise of
reorganization, although in that case they are entitled to a pension
if not to their salaries. 5 Nor can they be transferred from one
court to another, if the transfer entails a diminution of rank or
salary, except upon the advice of the Court of Cassation sitting
as the superior council of the magistracy."
There are certain judges, however, to whom the guaran-
tee against removal does not apply. Such are the justices
of the peace; this for the reason that until 1905 no profes-
sional qualifications were required of them, and, besides, they
are members of the judicial police and are charged with the
exercise of a few administrative functions. Many French
writers contend, however, that they should be irremovable like
other judges.5 7  Likewise, the judges in Algeria and the colonies
do not enjoy the benefit of irremovability. Nor do the judges of
the administrative courts, because they are at the same time active
functionaries of the administration.
The power of the government to remove the administrative
judges has often been the subject of criticism, because, it is said,
their dependence on the government makes them docile and
servile instruments of the administration. 8 In practice, however,
they are never interfered with and there have been no removals
since the Second Empire. In fact they have shown a remarkable
independence and have often decided important controversies
between the government and private individuals in favor of the
latter, sometimes to the serious discomfiture of the government.59
The members of the standing magistracy of course are remov-
,5 Bonfils, op. cit., p. 28; Alasseur, L'inamovabiliti des juges, p. 20.
56 The rule as to non-transfer has been a subject of attack by members
of the Radical party who maintain that the government should be free
to transfer a judge who by reason of his long residence, family con-
nections and property interests in the community in which he resides is
unfit to discharge impartially his judicial functions. Compare the Spanish
and Portuguese law which forbids a judge to remain longer than eight
years in the community where he has married, or if he or his family have
acquired property there.
57 See Alasseur, op. cit., p. 29. In fact they are sometimes removed for
political reasons though not frequently. See on this point an article in
16 REV. DE DROIT PUB. pp. 103 ff.
58 In this respect the position of the French administrative judges differs
from those of Germany, who are irremovable by the government.
59 Instances are given in my article on Judicial Control of Administrative
and Legislative Acts in France, 9 AmmE. POL. Sci. Ray. pp. 637 ff.
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able because their functions are partly political.80  While the
practice of irremovability, subject to the exceptions mentioned,
has become a well-established principle of French public law, it
has not always escaped attack from certain quarters. It was
criticised by Jules Favre, a great jurist, in his day,61 and its
abolition is now demanded by the Radical party.62  They argue
that the judiciary is still encumbered by a considerable number
of judges who are hostile to republicanism, and that others are
under the influence of clericalism.
Notwithstanding the fact that the principle of irremovability
has always been affirmed as a rule of French public law since
i8oo, it has, in fact, been violated by nearly all the successive
regimes that have ruled France. Napoleon after having pro-
claimed the principle, "purged" the magistracy in 18o7, and
again in I8io, of the judges who were hostile to his regime. The
charter of 1814 affirmed the principle of irremovability, but, in
fact, it was violated by the restored Bourbons who "chased from
the bench" Napoleon's appointees.6 3  The principle of irremova-
bility was reaffirmed by the charter of I83O, but, in obedience
to the demand of the Liberals, the government of Louis Philippe
proceeded to purge the judiciary of a considerable number of
Bourbon magistrates who were charged with being partisans
of the dogma of divine right and secret enemies of popular
sovereignty.64
60 The judges of the court of accounts are, however, irremovable. The
judges of the councils of prud'hommes and of the commercial tribunals
being elected for definite terms cannot of course be removed by the
government.
61 De la riforme judiciaire, pp. 29, 99.
62 See the resolution adopted by the party at its annual congress in 1o2,
Charpentier, Le parti radical et radicale socialiste, i9o-i911, p. 263.
63 Alasseur, op. cit., p. 8I ; Faye, La Cour de Cassation, p. 9. Faye says
the great jurist Merlin, first president of the Court of Cassation, one
president of a chamber, fourteen councillors, and two advocates-general
were driven from their positions. A large number of councillors of the
courts of appeal were also removed. In the south, the Napoleonic judges
did. not even dare to remain in the cities where they exercised their
functions, so strong was the hostility toward them and so great was the
danger to their lives. Malepeyre, op. cit., pp. io7-1o8, says about one-
half the Napoleonic magistrates were displaced and the others were
required to adjure their imperialistic sympathies. The two groups, he
says, always remained enemies, but they rivalled each other by the sub-
serviency which they showed toward the new regime and by their efforts
to prove their royalist sympathies.
64 The downfall of the Bourbon regime in I83O was followed by a wide-
spread demand for an ipuration of the judiciary. The dynasty, it was
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Some of the judges appointed by Charles X refused to take
the oath of allegiance to Louis Philippe and were thereby auto-
matically removed. 5  The control of the government over
judicial promotions was also effectively used against judges
suspected of being out of sympathy with the new r6gime. The
partisans of Charles X admitted that many of his judicial-appoint-
ments were thoroughly bad; but they argued that it would be
setting a dangerous precedent to violate the constitutional prin-
ciple of irremovability by laying hands on the judiciary, and
using it to serve party ends.
The downfall of the July monarchy in x848 was not accom-
panied by any such widespread popular demand for an ipuration
of the judiciary as took place in 1830, for the reason that the
magistrates, appointed by the government of Louis Philippe, were
much less reactionary and subservient to the crown than those
appointed during the Restoration. Nevertheless, the provisional
government in 1848 issued a decree declaring that the principle
of irremovability had disappeared with the abrogation of the
Charter of i83o and the minister of justice was authorized to
said, had been changed, the chamber of peers purged, the parquets trans-
formed and the administration reconstituted: why not purge the judiciary
and thereby complete the revolution? Meantime riots, agitations, and
demonstrations directed against the Bourbon judges were taking place in
the provinces, the chief participants being those who alleged that they
had been the victims of judicial persecution at the hands of Charles X'sjudges. At Metz the ceremony of reinstallation and oath taking of the
old judges was marked by insults and threats directed against these un-
popular magistrates. At Poitiers, Nancy and other places similar scenes
took place. Judges were warned to resign, some were threatened with
death; all were insulted. The bar of Clermont drew up a petition to the
chamber of deputies demanding the removal of Charles X's judges; the
people it was said had no confidence in them and there was no more
reason why a judge's toga should be regarded as inviolable than that of
a peer. See Picot, op. cit., p. go; Malepeyre, op. cit., pp. 129 ff.
65 Two presidents of the court of appeal, a vice-president, and eightjudges of the tribunal of the Seine were removed in consequence of their
refusal to take the oath. Alasseur, op. cit., p. 93; Picot, op. cit., p. 83.
Altogether about one hundred sitting magistrates, or about one-twentieth
of the total, were displaced. A much larger number of standing magis-
trates were dismissed. Nearly all the procureurs of the courts of appeal,
more than fifty advocates-general and substitutes, and some 254 pro-
cureurs and substitutes of the tribunals were thus gotten rid of. The
auditor judges were abolished on the ground that they had been used for
political purposes, particularly to pack the courts in order to overcome
majorities against-the government.
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remove judges in the public interest at his discretion. A number
of Louis Philippe's judges were accordingly dismissed and a still
larger number of standing magistrates were removed. This
action of the provisional government, however, was not generally
approved, and in the National Assembly of 1849 it was severely
attacked during the course of a memorable debate on the ques-
tion of irremovability.
Cremieux, the minister of justice, and one of the leading
jurists of his time, however, defended the thesis of incompati-
bility between the principle of irremovability and the theory of
republican government, and attempted to justify the removals
made by him under the decree of 1848.68 He was ably and elo-
quently answered by Montalembert and Jules Favre, both of
whom contended that there was no popular demand for an
6puration of the judiciary, and that the suspension of the rule of
irremovability Would introduce anarchy and chaos into the judicial
establishment. This argument prevailed, the National Assembly
by a vote of 344 to 322 affirmed the principle of irremovability,
and it became a part of the constitution of the Second Republic.
A decree followed, restoring the magistrates who had been
removed by the provisional government in 1848.
With the downfall of the Second Republic and the establish-
ment of the Second Empire, another 6puration followed. Napo-
leon III asserted that the magistracy inspired neither the respect
nor the confidence of the public, and a number of judges were
removed.67  The requirement of a new oath compelled several
resignations, and a decree reducing the age limit at which judges
were compelled to retire provided the means of getting rid of
others still. One of the first acts of the government of the
national defense in 187o was to remove 90 members of the
standing magistracy,68 and this was followed next year by a
decree removing fifteen judges of the sitting magistracy who had
served as members of certain "mixed commissions" in 1852.
Before the end of the year, however, this decree was annulled
68 Perrier, De la r~vocation des fonctionnaires, p. 96.
67 Napoleon, says Jules Favre, "chased out three councillors of the
Court of Cassation with the sword after a gendarme under his orders
had previously mutilated their registers." Riforme judiciaire, p. 23.
Again, says Malepeyre, op. cit., p. 1SO, the judges "flopped over," pro-
claimed their sympathy for Napoleon III, and even sent him an address
of felicitation asking for the establishment of the Empire.
8 Malepeyre, op. cit., p. 152.
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by the Nlational Assembly on the ground that it was in violation
of the well-established principle of irremovability.
The last ipuration of the judiciary occurred in 1883. At this
time the Republicans were in control of both the Senate and the
Chamber of Deputies and a Republican President (Gr6vy) occu-
pied the Elyse. They complained that many of the judges
appointed by the government under the monarchist president,
McMahon, were reactionaries and hostile to the Republican
r~gime. The Palais de Jwstice, it was said, had become "the
fortified camp of the enemy" and the judges were the "docile
instruments" of de Broglie and McMahon. They were de-
nounced not only for their hostility to Republicanism, but also
for their severity toward offenders suspected of unfriendliness
to the McMahon regime, and the elimination of all such magis-
trates was widely demanded. When Gambetta became the chief
of la grande ministre in 1881 he promised this reform, but he
went out of office before it was realized.8 9 In the following year
the government brought in a bill suspending the principle of
irremovability, ostensibly to eliminate a large number of useless
judges who, then as now, encumbered the judiciary, but in reality
to enable it to purge the judiciary of anti-Republican magistrates.
This bill was passed by the Chamber of Deputies, but it encoun-
tered strong opposition in the Senate where it was argued that
the principle of irremovability had become a constitutional rule,
and could not be suspended by act of the legislature. True,
it had not been expressly affirmed by the constitution of 1875
but neither had the principles of the Declaration of Rights of
1789. Like the principles of 1789, it was not regarded therefore
as necessary to reaffirm what had become a well-established prin-
ciple of the public law of the country. As was well known, the
constitution of 1875 was an oeuvre d'urgence, a compromise
between political parties, an instrument 'which attempts to deal
only with the organization and relation of the public powers, and
is distinguished rather more for what it omits than for what it
contains. Its silence, therefore, afforded no basis for an argu-
ment that the irremovability of the judges was not a constitu-
tional principle.
The action of the National Assembly in 1871 (the body which
subsequently framed the present constitution) in annulling the
09 Reinach, La ininistire Gambetta, p. 295.
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decree of the government of the national defense removing cer-
tain judges, this on the ground that the decree was contrary to
the principle of irremovability, was evidence that the framers
of the constitution of 1875 regarded irremovability as an estab-
lished constitutional principle.70 The minister of justice, however,
argued that the principle of irremovability was only a statutory
protection which might be withdrawn at will by the legislature,
and this would seem to be the sounder view.7 ' Nevertheless,
the Senate refused to accept the bill in the form in which it
passed the Chamber, and, as finally adopted, the words "irre-
movability is suppressed" were omitted. It provided, however,
that within three months the government should proceed to
reduce the personnel of the tribunals and the courts of appeal, the
reduction to bear indiscriminately on the entire personnel, the
number of magistrates to be eliminated not to exceed the number
of seats suppressed. Thus, in form, the law was a reorganiza-
tion measure, but, in reality, its purpose was to suspend the
principle of irremovability-to enable the government to purge
the magistracy. Under the authority thus granted, the govern-
ment eliminated about 850 members of the sitting and standing
magistracy.72 That the law was, in reality, not a reorganization
measure, but an 6puration proceeding, is shown by the fact that
no important changes were made in the organization of the
judiciary, or in the mode of appointment, advancement or tenure
of the judges.
These successive 6purations constitute a regrettable chapter in
the history of the French judiciary. With the incoming of each
new regime many able magistrates were driven from the bench
for no other reason than that they had received their appoint-
ments from a government which had been overthrown. As
Coumoul aptly observes, although the principle of irremovability
has always been regarded as one of the bases of French public
law, it has been so often suspended for the purpose of eliminating
magistrates who were suspected of being out of sympathy with
the government at a particular moment, that it constitutes a
precarious and illusory guarantee.73
70 Cf. Perrier, op. cit., p. IoO; Alasseur, op cit, p. 26.
71 Cf. Delpech, 21 REV. DE DROIT PUB. pp. 815 ff.
72 Perrier, op. cit., p. 97. Alasseur, op. cit., p. 131, says 383 sitting magis-
trates and 231 standing magistrates were removed.
73 Le pouvoir judiciaire, p. 32o
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VIII
RETIREMENT ON ACCOUNT OF AGE AND INFIRMITY
'The guarantee against removal by the government does not
mean life tenure for the judges, for they are now required to
retire upon reaching a certain age. The first legislation on the
subject was passed in 1824. This law provided for the creation,
in each court and tribunal, of a commission composed of magis-
trates empowered to compel the resignation of any member of
the court, who by reason of age or infirmity had become incapable
of discharging effectively his duties. No age limit was pre-
scribed by the law. Resignations were forced through intimida-
tion, and pressure was exercised through the intermediation of
the president and procureur gin~rale of the court. It was a
disagreeable and embarrassiig duty thus imposed on the judges
who constituted the commissions, and it appears to have been
rarely exercised, and ultimately the law fell into desuetude.74
With the establishment of the Second Empire a decree was
issued (1852) making it obligatory upon judges of the tribunals
and courts of appeal to retire at the age of seventy and council-
lors of the Court of Cassation to retire at seventy-five. It w'as
complained that the courts were then encumbered with aged
magistrates who were not only incapable of performing theirjudicial duties but whose presence was an embarrassment to the
courts in which they sat. While the pretext for the decree was
to eliminate unfit judges, the real reason was political; that is,
the desire of the Emperor to purge the courts of magistrates who
were known to be hostile to his regime. The measure was vigor-
ously opposed by all the judges, young and old alike, and was
severely attacked by the bar and the writers on judicial reform.7 5
The evil it did to the magistracy, says B6renger, was incalculable,
since it not only compelled the retirement of many distinguished,
able, and independent magistrates who were still in the vigor of
74 Picot, op. cit., p. 355. The members of the commission, says OdillonBarrot, hesitated to expel their honored colleagues from the bench because
of their age and few resignations were extorted. Organisation judiciaire,
P. 77.
75 Favre, Riforme judiciaire, p. 23; Barrot, Organisation judiciaire, p.76; Picot, op. cit., p. 352. It was an odious measure, says Favre, issued
under the pretext of safeguarding the magistracy.
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their powers;"8 but the vacancies which were thus created
demoralized the magistracy by exciting among the remaining
judges an ambition for advancement, which led to undignified
solicitations, and opened the door to political influences. 77  In
i87o, an effort was made to repeal the decree of 1852 but without
success, and, like other decrees of that period it remains in
force.
Ix
REMOVAL FOR CRIME AND NEGLECT OF DUTY
Finally, the judges may be censured, reprimanded, suspended,
or removed by the Court of Cassation sitting as a superior council
of the magistracy, all the chambers united.
78 In all such cases
the Court of Cassation acts upon the proposal of the minister of
justice, and the government is represented by the procureur-
76 Odillon Barrot, who severely criticized the decree, remarks that he
had pleaded before judges like Henrion de Pansey, Grandon Carnot,
Lapaquy and others, all of whom, though- over eighty years of age, were
still in the vigor of their strength, and whose judgments, by reason of
their long experience, enjoyed the highest authority. It was, he says, a
sacrilege to require them to leave the bench. Ibid., p. 75. Jules Favre,
op. cit., p. 58, criticizing the injustice of the decree, said: "I have seen a
first president, who was still after long years of service the light of the
great court of which he was the head, forced to retire while yet in the
fullness of his moral and physical vigor, yet declared legally incapacitated
when his eminent faculties demonstrated every day his usefulness by
their incomparable superiority. Neither the authority which he had
acquired nor the veneration and affection with which he was regarded nor
the unappreciable value of his noble labor could save him."
77 The "fever of advancement" which the resulting vacancies created
among the remaining magistrates, says Malepeyre, led to the desertion
of their posts by some judges who descended upon the chancellery to
solicit promotions. The minister of justice was obliged to issue a circular
warning the judges that they must remain at their posts and notifying
them that no leaves of absence would be granted to enable them to solicit
promotions personally from the chancellery. Op. cit., p. x46.
78The power of the Court of Cassation to remove, does not extend
to the Algerian and colonial judges who are removable by the govern-
ment nor to the standing magistrates for the same reason nor to the
judges of the commercial tribunals who are elected for definite terms.
Until 1883, the disciplinary power over the magistrates was exercised by
the respective courts to which they belonged but the law of 1883 with
a view of unifying the pouvoir disciplinaire centered it in the Court of
Cassation. Morillot, La Cour de Cassation, Conseil supirieur de la
magistrature, chap. i.
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gjndrale. The accused magistrate is of course entitled to be
heard in his defense. Among the grounds for which judges may
be removed by the Conseil Superieur are crimes and even misde-
meanors of which they have been duly convicted, neglect of duty,
scandals in private life, political activity, and acts which seriously
compromise their dignity and character.79
By an extraordinary procedure known as prise i partie, an
action in damages may be brought by an injured party against
a judge, or even against the entire court for various acts com-
mitted in the discharge of their functions, such as fraud, conspir-
acy, extortion, arbitrary conduct, wilful denial of justice, etc.
This proceeding is based on the principle that every .individual
is bound to make reparation to an injured party for his acts. It
existed in the law of the ancien r6gime and was revived by
Napoleon. 0 The courts of appeal have jurisdiction of such
actions against justices of the peace; against judges of the
tribunals of first instance, the commercial courts, the courts of
assizes, and against magistrates of their own court. The Court
of Cassation has jurisdiction of similar actions against the court
of assizes as a whole, against the court of appeal entire, and
against the councillors of its own court. If the petition to
bring such an action is granted the case is tried by the court in
solemn audience, all the chambers united. In case the action is
held not to be well founded a fine of not less than 3oo francs
is imposed on the plaintiff; if the judge is convicted he or his
heirs is condemned to pay damages in a certain sum.8' The
Radical party would go even further and make the judges liable
in damages for judicial errors committed by them. 2
79The courts are forbidden to deliberate upon political matters and
every manifestation or demonstration of hostility to the principle or the
form of government is interdicted to magistrates. In 1882, a magistrate
was removed for causing to be taken down from the faqade of a court
house on the 14th of July an illuminated sign bearing the words "Repub-lique francaise" after breaking with his cane certain Venetian lanternslighted with the national colors. In the same year a magistrate was
removed for delivering an address at a royalist banquet in which he
advocated the restoration of the Monarchy. See on the whole subjec.
Faye, La Cour de Cassation, pp. 498 if; Morillot, op. cit.; Alasseur, op.
cit., pp. ii if; and Durand, De la discipline dans la inagistrature.
80 Morizot-Thibault, De la risponsabiliti des magistrats, pp. 11-12.
81 See on the whole subject of actions in the nature of prise d partie
Faye, La Cour de Cassation, pp. 487 if; Bonfils, Traiti d'org jud.. pp.528 if; Garsonnet, Pricis de procidure civile, secs. 785 if; Morizot-
Thibault, op. cit., and Rolland, 26 REV. DE DROIT PUB. pp. 723 ff.81 Charpentier, Le parti radical et radicale socialiste, p. 273.
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X
PROMOTIONS IN THE MAGISTRACY
Although the French judges, with the exceptions mentioned,
are protected against removal by the government, they are not
protected against being kept indefinitely in the inferior posts
where their judicial careers are usually begun. They are depen-
dent upon the government for their advancement and there-
fore guarantee against removal means little unless they are
assured the promotion to which their age, long service and talents
entitle them. This is notably the case in France where the judi-
ciary is hierarchically organized, where the judges are grouped
in classes and grades,8 3 each of which carries a higher salary and
prestige than the one below and where original appointments are
made of the lower posts, vacancies in the higher magistracy being
usually filled by promotion from the inferior magistracy.
8 4 The
situation is entirely different from that of England and the
United States where the judges are not arranged in a multiplicity
of grades or classes with different salaries, and where the system
of regular promotion from the lower to the higher posts hardly
exists, the higher judgeships, comparatively few in number as
compared with those in France, being usually filled by appoint-
ments from the bar.8 5 In France the bench and bar are two
83 Thus we find in the French hierarchy, first presidents, presidents,
presidents of chambers, councillors, judges, substitutes, suppliants, etc.
84Thus recently when a vacancy occurred in the court of appeal at
Limoges, a judge of the tribunal of first instance at Paris was appointed
to the vacancy. The vacancy at Paris was filled by the appointment of
a substitute of the procureur of that tribunal; the latter vacancy was
filled by the transfer of the procureur at Mons; the vacancy at Mons
was filled by the promotion of a procureur in a smaller town and so on.
Again, when a vacancy occurred in the court of appeals at Bourges, it
was filled by the promotion of the president of the tribunal of Le Puy.
So when a vacancy occurred in the court of appeal at Paris the vice-
president of the tribunal of first instance of Paris was promoted to it,
while the president of the tribunal at Rambouillet was transferred to the
vacancy thus created at Paris. The consequence is that the French
magistracy is characterized by extraordinary mobility. Barrot, op. cit.,
p. 8o, stated that within ten years more than sixty new magistrates arrived
at the Paris court of appeals.
851n England the judges of the High Court and the court of appeal
receive the same pay, and vacancies in both are usually filled by the
appointment of the attorney-general or a prominent barrister. The idea
that promotions are dangerous to the morale of the judiciary is so strongly
intrenched in England that no county judge has ever been promoted to
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separate and distinct professions and members of the bar are
rarely appointed judges.8 6 The French judiciary is a magistra-
ture de carrimre, and its posts are reserved for those who haveprepared themselves especially for judicial careers. A success-
ful candidate usually begins as a suppliant without pay, then hebecomes a suppliant with pay, then a substitute, then a judge of
a tribunal of first instance in a small town with a salary far less
than is sufficient for his support. From this latter position he
aspires to -the presidency of the tribunal, then to the membership
of the court of appeal and, finally, his crowning ambition is to
wear the red robe of a councillor of the Court of Cassation . De
the High Court and there have been very few cases of promotions fromany court since 1873. A judge who is appointed to the King's Bench,for example, usually remains there all his life. He has nothing to expect
or to fear from the government, and is therefore under no temptation
to solicit favors or to shape his judicial conduct to meet the approval ofthe government. There, also, appointments to the bench are never dictated
or influenced by members of Parliament as is the case in France.
86 Except of course Procureurs, procureurs-giniraux, and advocats-giniraux, who belong to the standing magistracy and who are frequently
transferred to vacant posts in the sitting magistracy.
87 The actual working of the system is illustrated by what happened in
Ig2 when M. Ballot-Beaupr6, first president of the Court of Cassation,
retired. His place was filled by the appointment of M. Baudouin, pro-
cureur-ginirale of the Court of Cassation. The vacancy created by thepromotion of M. Baudouin was filled by the appointment of a president
of one of the chambers of the Court of Cassation. The latter vacancy
was filled by the promotion of a councillor of the Court of Cassation.The vacant councillorship was filled by the transfer of the president ofthe court of appeal at Douai; the latter vacancy, by the transfer of thepresident of the court of appeal at Lille; the latter by the transfer ofthe president of the court of appeal at Dunkirk whose post was in turnfilled by the appointment of the bdtonnier of the bar at Cambrai. Thejudicial career of the present president of the Court of Cassation affords
another good illustration of how the system works. He began as a sub-
stitute at Chateaulin; from there he passed to a similar post at Quimper
and later to Rennes; then he filled in succession the positions of substi-tute for the procureur-gin irale at Rennes, avocat-gintrale at the Court
of Cassation, president of the tribunal of the Seine, and procureur-gin-6rale of the Court of Cassation, from which he was promoted to the presi-dency of the court eleven years later, at the age of sixty-six years, and
after some forty years' service in the standing and sitting magistracies.M. Sarrut who succeeded him as procureur-ginirate of the Court of Cas-
sation has had a somewhat similar career:. avocat-ginirale at Grenoble,
substitute for the procureur-ginirale at Paris, avocat-gn6,rale of the Court
of Cassation, president of a chamber of the same court, and finally pro-
cureur-ginirate.
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Tocqueville in his day complained that the judge gained his
grades very much as the soldier in the army does.88 A French
judge never ceases to aspire until he has reached the summit of
the hierarchy. His future is almost wholly in the hands of the
minister of justice who may, if he wishes, keep an ambitious
and able judge whose politics he dislikes in an inferior post all
his life, or he may disregard the rule of seniority and promote
a petty provincial magistrate to one of the highest courts in
Paris or some other large city. Everything depends upon his
will. Different from England, where hardly more than a half-
dozen important judgeships are at the disposal of the govern-
ment each year, hundreds, almost thousands, of vacancies in the
French magistracy must be filled annually by new appointments
or transfers. Naturally the minister of justice cannot be familiar
with the qualifications of the hundreds who aspire to promotion
and he, therefore, depends largely on recommendations. Unlike
Napoleon who usually adopted the recommendations of the
President and the procureur-ginirale of the court in which the
vacancy occurred, the ministers of justice to-day rely mainly on
the recommendations of senators and deputies, who have the
advantage of the former in that they can present their recom-
mendations to the chancellery in person, whereas those of pro-
cureurs-gdn6raux and presidents of the courts can only be com-
municated in writing. The disposition to do this is accentuated
by the shortness of the ministerial tenure and the desire of the
government to obtain the support of influential members of Par-
liament upon whom their own continuance in office depends.89
No recommendation counts for so much as that of an influential
senator or deputy who belongs to the party in power. Under
these circumstances aspiring judges naturally turn to the sen-
ators and deputies with their solicitations, and those who are
fortunate enough to have influential friends in Parliament are
88 Dinocratie en Amirique, Vol. II, p. 178.
8o Compare the satirical comments of Eug~ne Brieux in his drama
La Robe Rouge (Act I, scene 2) where Mine. Vagret tells her husband
that Manteuil has been appointed avocat-ginirale although he was a
suppliant at Luneville when M. Vagert was a substitute. Yes, replies
Vagret, but he has a cousin who is a deputy. Then, says Mme. Vagret,
we have no chance. Still, says M. Vagret, I have the formal promise of
the procureur-ginirale, to which Mine. Vagret replies, "Ah, but it is the
recommendation of the deputy that you must have."
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too often those who are rewarded.90 In this way the indepen-
dence of the judiciary has been seriously impaired, inordinate
ambitions aroused, the judges have become perpetual solicitors,91
their dignity and prestige abased, and a milieu created which
causes their honesty and integrity sometimes to be suspected.
Some Frenchmen have so far despaired of the situation as to
advocate the return to the system of venalit which prevailed
during the ancien r6gime.9 2  The evil is not a new one. It has
existed in France under all regimes since Napoleon's day and it
has been a never ceasing object of criticism by judicial reformers.
The liberals during the period of the Restoration protested against
the employment by the government of the power of promotion to
make obsequious and docile instruments of the judges, thus ren-
dering illusory the guarantee of irremovability. The same com-
plaint was made throughout the period of the July Monarchy.
Appointments and promotions it was said were determined
mainly by political considerations, friends and relatives of the
deputies, and even the deputies themselves, being the chief bene-
ficiaries. During the Second Empire the situation was still
90 Whenever there is a change in the ministry of justice, says Picot, thejudges descend upon the Palais Bourbon and besiege the deputies for
advancement, and the latter in turn besiege the chancellery. Such a
spectacle, he adds, "is revolting and tends to impair respect for thejudiciary." M. Joseph Reinach in the Chamber of Deputies, Dec. 13, I9o6,described vividly the system of solicitations. "From the beginning to the
end of the year," he said, "we are solicited and we solicit. We write
or sign, twenty, thirty, forty or fifty letters a day, depending on thedegree of influence attributed to us." The time of deputies he complained
was largely taken up with appeals for appointments and promotions.
Compare also the remarks of M. Steeg in the Chamber on May 8, 1907.91 The demoralizing effect of the fivre de 'avancement with which the
system inoculates the magistracy has been dwelt upon by many French
writers. See especially an article by Rengade, La magistrature et lad~mocratie, 79 REv. POL. Er PARL. pp. 494-495, who takes the position that
the rank and salary of all magistrates should be equal, and that the
system of promotions should be abolished so as to free the judges from
the control of deputies and eliminate politics from the judiciary. Brieux
in La Robe Rouge (Act I, scene 6) satirizes the system. La Bouzule is
made to say that the thing which makes bad judges of so many honest
men is the "malady of advancement." "If they were not infected by this
microbe they would be honest judges and gentlemen instead of cruel
and servile magistrates. There are some who do not solicit promotions
but they are obscure magistrates who have no ambition."
92 For example, M. Faguet, the well-known literary critic. See his books,
Le culte d'incompetence and La horreur des risponsabilitis.
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worse, and, if we may believe the charges that one hears every-
where in France, the evil is still prevalent.
3
All writers on the judiciary without exception have inveighed
against the evil of such a system: Benjamin Constant, Rossi,
Vivien, Laboulaye, de Tocquevilfe, de Broglie, Pr~vost-Paradol,
Odillon Barrot, Picot, Malepeyre, Dehesdin, Desjardins, Cou-
moul, Jules Favre, M. Cruppi, and many others. Gambetta,
9
'
Favre and Jules Simon, three great pillars of the Third Republic,
in their speeches in the early seventies attacked it as destructive
of the independence of the judiciary. Odillon Barrot in his day
declared that the "fever of advancement" and the dependence
of the judges upon the government for their promotion was the
"greatest reproach" against the magistracy. The late Professor
Saleilles characterized it as the "supreme evil from which our
democracy suffers." 95  Jules Favre said of it, "I know of no
greater power of control over the judge."9 6  It has been repeat-
edly attacked by reporters of the judicial budget 7 and by mem-
bers of Parliament themselves,98 by the General Prison Society
9 3 1n 187o the question of freeing the magistracy from the control of
the government was much discussed and a projit for this purpose was
prepared by a commission composed of distinguished jurists including
such names as those of Arago, Cremieux, Faustin-Helie, Dareste and
others. Brenger speaking on the measure said: "It is not true that
when a judge has once been invested with the robe, although irremovable,
he is entirely dependent on the executive power for his advancement and
that in consequence of the grades with which the judiciary has been so
cleverly encumbered he is under the necessity of addressing himself every
four or five years to the executive unless he wishes to remain where he
started?" Quoted by Coumoul, op. cit., p. 283.
9' Notably in his celebrated speech at Belleville in i87o, and in his
declaration as chief of the ministry in I881.
95 Bu.x'rm DE LA socIEVfi G NA f M.E DES PRIsONS (Dec. 19, i9o6).
Be Op. cit., p. 42.
07 Notably by M. Cruppi who in his report on the budget of justice in
i9o3 referring to the control exercised by the deputies over judicial pro-
motions said: "It is intolerable that men who are charged with the duty
of judging their fellow citizens are dependent upon the influence of
politicians for their security, their life, their salary, their daily bread, and
their future." JouRNAL OFFIcIEL, Ch. des Dips. (19o3) Annexe, No. 1192,
p. 1225.
98 M. Joseph Reinach speaking on the budget of i9o7 referred to "the
sad and humiliating situation resulting from the r~gime of favoritism
and solicitations." He read a letter from a magistrate who said: "if
we do not solicit without ceasing we will never advance." "If we do
not put an end to this abuse," M. Reinach added, "I shall prefer to
return to the system of popular election, rather than see a system main-
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and many other bodies interested in the reform of the judiciary.9
Every year when the judicial budget is under debate the minister
of justice calls attention to the abuses of the present system, and
there are always some deputies who demand a change. But so
far they have been in the minority.
A step in the direction of reform, however, was made by the
decree of i9o8, referred to above, which provides for the annual
preparation of a list of judges (tableau d'avancement) eligible
to and most deserving of promotion, and which prohibits the
advancement in rank, or the increase in salary, of any judge
whose name is not inscribed on the tableau. 00 The decree also
reduces somewhat the number of grades and classes in the
hierarchy. The tableau is prepared by the minister of justice on
the advice of a commission composed of the first president, the
procureur-ginirale, and f6ur members of the court in which the
vacancy is to be filled, together with four representatives of the
ministry of justice. Any judge who thinks his name should be
on the tableau may address a petition to a commission of classifi-
cation composed of the directors of the ministry of justice and
six councillors of the Court of Cassation. When a promotion
is to be made the minister must make his choice from the names
on the tableau, except that he is allowed to choose from names
not on the list, a number equal to one-fourth the total number of
vacancies occurring during the year. This decree diminishes to
some extent the abuse of favoritism and arbitrariness on the part
of the minister of justice, but it is evident that his discretion is
still large and writers are not lacking who consider that the
reform will result in little or no improvement01
tained in which magistrates are promoted upon the basis of the recom-
mendations of Senators and Deputies." JOURNAL om icrEL (Dec. 13, i9o6)
pp. 3209-3210. See also to the same effect the remarks of Deputy Bompard
on Dec. io, 1goo.
99 See the discussion by members of the society, in the REvUE PENI-
TENTIAIRE for Nov. I904, July i9o6, and Jan. i9o7. Among the dis-
tinguished jurists who denounced the system at these meetings were Picot,
Garcon, Larnaude, Saleilles and Berth6lemy. Picot referred to it as "a
spectacle of vagabondage and judicial mendicity."
100 Tableaus of advancement had long been established in various
branches of the administrative service and the extension of the principle
to the magistracy was demanded by the judges and judicial reformers.
On the whole subject see Dehesdin, op. cit., pp. 336 ff.
101 Cf. Demartial, 52 REv. Po0. ET PAR.L. pp. 86 if; Coumoul, op. cit., p.




COMPENSATION OF THE JUDGES
In addition to the faults of a system which makes advance-
ment in the magistracy largely dependent upon political consid-
erations the French judges are inadequately, not to say miserably,
paid. In this respect their situation forms a striking contrast
to that of the highly paid British magistracy and even to that
of the American judges. Aside from the slight augmentatiofis
made in the scale of salaries in 1883 for the judges outside Paris,
there has been no increase since I86o, notwithstanding the fact
that the cost of living has doubled or trebled. More than 6oo
sppliant judges receive no pay at all during the first five years
of their service, and the other 2oo receive only $3oo a year.'0 2
After five years as a supplgant the magistrate ordinarily becomes
a judge of the tribunal of first instance, third class, at a salary of
$6oo a year, or a substitute at $48o from which five per cent is
deducted for pensions. 03 Excluding justices of the peace, the
majority of French magistrates belong to thiS category. By the
time a judge is forty or fifty years of age he may become a
councillor of the court of appeal or a judge of the tribunal of
the Seine at a salary of $1,5O0 or $2,ooo a year. The highest
paid judges of course are the councillors of the Court of Cassa-
tion, the president of which receives $6,ooo a year, the presidents
of the chambers $5,ooo, the other councillors $3,600. Councillors
of the courts of appeal receive from $i,ooo to $2,2oo, except the
presidents of chambers, who receive from $1,500 to $2,700
according to the class to which they belong, and the first presi-
dents of the court, who receive from $3,ooo to $5,0o0. The sal-
aries of judges of the tribunals of first instance range from $480 to
$i,6oo, depending on the class to which they belong. Vice-presi-
dents receive from $675 to $2,ooo and presidents from $720 to
$4,ooo.0 1 4 Until 1905 the pay of justices of the peace was lament-
102 Recently the Chamber of Deputies agreed to raise the pay of salaried
suppliants from $3oo to $5oo but the Senate rejected the proposal.
'
0 3 The French judges are entitled to a pension upon the attainment of
sixty years of age. It is, however, lamentably small, the maximum being
$I,4oo a year, an amount which very few judges ever in fact receive.
lO4Jules Favre, op. cit., p. 42, stated that, in 1877, 727 judges of first




ably small, more than 2,ooo of them receiving only $2oo a year.
By a law of that year, which was intended to rehabilitate these
long neglected but highly important courts, the qualifications for
appointment were raised, the justices were made eligible for pro-
motion to the tribunal of first instance and their pay was in-
creased. They are now divided into five classes with salaries
ranging from $500 to $I,6oo depending on the class and grade.
There are still, however, more than 2,ooo who receive only $500
a year and less than i2o who receive as much as $i,ooo.
Prior to 1883 there were some twenty different classes of
judges with varying salaries. Thus there were six classes of
judges of first instance, and six classes of councillors, of the
courts of appeal. The law of 1883 reduced somewhat the num-
ber of classes but it is still large, a circumstance which increases
the dependence of the judges on the government, and accentuates
their temptation to solicit promotions. Frequent proposals have
been made to abolish the system of classes and introduce the
English and German systems of equality of rank and pay for all
judges of the same court, but as yet such proposals have not met
with favor.10 5
Strangely enough the classification of tribunals is based not
on the amount of business which they handle, but on the basis of
the population of the towns in which they sit. The absurdity of
such a basis of classification becomes evident when we compare
the populations of the districts as a whole. Thus the tribunal
of Bethune falls in the third class, although the population of
the district is over 3oo,ooo, while that of Barcellonette in the same
class has a population of only 13,000. So the tribunal of Mimes
has seven judges, or one for every 24,ooo inhabitants, whereas
that of Bethune has six judges, or one for 52,ooo inhabitants.1 0 6
Apparently everyone in France admits that the scale of judicial
salaries (it is said to be the lowest in Europe except in Italy) is
totally inadequate.107 In the great majority of cases it is insuffi-
105 Jules Favre, op. cit., p. 78, advocated such a remedy and it was urged
by others in 1848, i87o and i88o. Compare Picot, op. cit., p. 349; and
Dehesdin, op. cit., p. 428.
106 For other similar inequalities see Dehesdin, op. cit., p. 425.
107 de Jouvenal in his La r~publique des comrades, p. 148, remarks
that a French judge is gray with old age before his salary amounts to as
much as that of a sub-lieutenant in the army. Compare on this point
also Dehesdin, op. cit., p. 157, Malepeyre, op. cit., p. 183; and Favre,
op. cit., p. 44.
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cient to support the judges. The Radical Party in particular has
protested against a situation which, as it alleges, debars "many
men of talent who are devoted to Republican institutions," and
whose sympathies are on the side of the toiling masses-a situa-
tion which in practice makes it necessary to confine appointments
to the well-to-do bourgeoisie, thus making the judiciary largely a
body of men of aristocratic sympathies and predilections.
0 s The
judges themselves have of course complained bitterly of their
miserable situation, and through their association amicale have
repeatedly urged a policy of better treatment.10 9 Writers on the
reform of the judiciary, ministers of justice, and reporters of the
judicial budget have for many years called attention to the inade-
quacy of the present scale of pay and have urged an increase.
Jules Favre more than forty years ago declared that the poverty
of the magistracy was not only a social crime, but still worse, it
was the result of political calculation. F-e praised the English
practice of paying the judges high salaries and of treating all
judges of the same court alike in this respect.110
In 1911 and 1912 the reporter of the judicial budget referring
to the inadequacy of the scale of compensation declared that the
magistracy was confronted by a crisis owing to the paucity of
108 Charpentier, La parti radical et radicale socialiste, 19o-i, p. 265.
l0At its annual meeting in 1914 the Association amicale expressed
the opinion that a French magistrate could not live on his official salary.
Contrary to the popular belief that the magistracy was composed of
aristocrats and men of wealth, it declared that the great majority of the
judges were men without private incomes and were wholly dependent
on their small stipends for the support of themselves and their families.
M. Malepeyre speaking before the amicale cited the pathetic case of a
magistrate's widow who had no means with which to pay the funeral
expenses of her husband. See also the BuLrrxN OF THE AMICALE (Dec.,
I913) which refers to several magistrates who had appealed for aid in
consequence of their inability to live on their judicial salaries. Such is
the lot of a magistrate, after fifteen or twenty years on the bench, says
the TEmPs in commenting on the situation. M. Loubat, procureur-gin-
irale at Lyon, says fully one-half the judges of France have no private
income and that with rare exceptions the remainder have only modest
fortunes. The situation of the great majority of them, he says, is
lamentable. It is impossible for them to live on the same level with
members of the bar, notaries, clerks, and even bailiffs, and in many cases
they are unable to support their families, educate their children or provide
marriage dowries for their daughters. Les ides de M. Faguet sur la
justice moderne, 72 REv. POL. Er PARL. p. 260.
110 Riforme judiciaire, p. 42.
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candidates, so unpromising had the judicial career become. I' In
1914 the minister of justice again called attention to the subject,
referred to the fact that there had been no substantial increase in
he pay of the judges since I6o, and declared that France spent
less for the maintenance of her judicial establishment than any
other European country.
Every proposal, however, to raise the pay of the judges has
failed on account of the state of the treasury. M. Ajam, reporter
of the judicial budget, in 1912 said it was impossible to provide
for the increase which everybody admitted to be desirable, until
there was a substantial reduction in the number of judges. The
first step, he said, was to abolish the large number of useless
tribunals and provide that those which remained should be held
by a single judge. To an Englishman, or an American, this would
appear to be the obvious remedy. This M. Viviani proposed in
1915, but like similar propositions in the past it was not adopted
by Parliament for the reasons stated above.
XII
GENERAL ESTIMATE OF THE FRENCH MAGISTRACY
In spite of the rather miserable situation of the French magis-
tracy resulting from the system of appointment and advancement,
described above, and from a totally inadequate scale of compensa-
tion, it compares favorably in independence, ability, integrity and
impartiality with that of any other country. The French judges
have been the victims of every revolution and change of rggimne
that has marked the checkered history of France since 1789.
With the advent of each new regime they have been denounced
I11 M. Cruppi, minister of justice, speaking on the subject in the
Chamber of Deputies on Nov. IO, 1911, described the pay of the judges
as "miserable" (traitements de mis~re). Already in i9o3 he had declared
that the magistracy was confronted by a crisis. "More and more," he said,
"the judicial career is being abandoned by the glite; the parquets no longer
find attachis and the most distinguished graduates of the law schools are
turning towards more inviting fields."
The Paris TEmps (May 6, 1913) referring to the "crisis" with which
the magistracy was threatened for lack of candidates said there were at
that time 200 vacant posts for which only fifty-three candidates had
appeared. See also its issue of May 28, 1912. As early as 1898 there was
a lack of candidates and since that date there has been a steady decrease.
Compare Dehesdin, op. cit., p. 18o
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and chased from the bench because they were suspected of being
'hostile to the government which succeeded that under which they
were appointed. Exposed to the temptation to alter their political
sympathies with every change of dynasty and compelled to solicit
promotions to which long service and distinguished talents en-
titled them, they have found it difficult to retain always the
public confidence or to escape the charge of complacency and
servility.112  The truth is, however, the French judges have
always since the Revolution shown a remarkable independence as
over against the government.'13 Recent examples may be found
in abundance in the controversies between the government and
the religious congregations. Hundreds of ill-founded prosecu-
tions against these establishments were instituted by direction of
the government, and, when it was beaten in the tribunals, it
carried the cases to the courts of appeal, only to find the judges
there, as below, firmly resolved to resist the government when-
ever it exceeded the authority which the legislature had given
it."14 Even the administrative judges, who are always removable
at the will of the government, have uniformly since the establish-
ment of the Third Republic decided against the government, and
upheld the rights of private individuals in cases where their
rights were safeguarded by law, this sometimes in the face of
112 This charge has recently been made by the late Emile Faguet, the
well-known literary critic in his two books, Le culte dincompetence and
La horreur des risponsabilitis.
113M. Loubat relates that on one occasion Napoleon being strongly
opposed to a decision which affected the treasury charged one of his
confidants with interviewing that great magistrate Henrion de Pansey,
president of the Court of Cassation, with a view to securing a modifica-
tion of the decision. de Pansey replied that the decision could not be
reversed. But His Majesty requires it, said the interviewer. Tell His
Majesty, said de Pansey, that it is better for the treasury to lose a
million than to have the authority of the Court of Cassation diminished
by an act of injustice.
114 Compare Loubat, op. cit., p. 250. -On the independence of the French
judges see Picot, op. cit., pp. 143 ff. There have occasionally been charges
that the government sometimes attempts to control the decisions of the
judges, e. g-, the cases of the Union Gingral; the Panama cases; the
Dreyfus affaire; the Humbert case; and that of Rochette. See Jouvenal,
La ripublique des comrades, p. 148. But the attempts have not usually
succeeded. M. Loubat examines and answers some charges of this kind
made by M. Faguet and he points out that under the system of plurality
of judges it would be difficult for the government to take revenge upon
the magistracy for decisions which it disapproved, owing to the impos-
sibility of fixing the responsibility upon a particular judge.
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strong pressure exerted by the government. 115 If anything, they
have shown a greater independence even than the judges of the
judicial courts and the government has never, at least since the
Second Empire, dared to remove one of them for lack of
subserviency.
Again, it is the almost unanimous testimony of French jurists
and text-writers that the judges have been remarkably impartial
in their judicial conduct. Charges of arbitrariness and excessive
severity such as are sometimes made against the English judges
are almost unknown in France."1 On the contrary it has been
complained that the French judges rather go to the opposite
extreme and exhibit an excessive indulgence toward accused per-
sons. 1 7  French judges certainly enjoy the reputation in their
own country of being unusually sympathetic and lenient toward
persons accused of crime.
Finally, French jurists, members of the bar, and writers on the
judiciary have all united in rendering homage to the judges for
their integrity and incorruptibility. Odillon Barrot, who in his
day criticised the organization of the judiciary and deplored the
influence of politics and favoritism in appointments and promo-
tions, paid a high tribute to the ability, independence and integ-
rity of the magistracy as a whole. "Justice with us," he declared,
"is pure and without stain."" 8
Jules Favre, the eminent jurist and statesman, writing a few
years later, declared that the French judges were incorruptible.
"They cannot," he said, "be eulogized enough; if they suffer
from the evils of the system, no one can withhold the tribute of
homage for their integrity, austere habits, and above all, for the
heroic courage with which great numbers of them face the pov-
erty of their situation.""19 Malepeyre, one of the most authori-
tative writers on the French judiciary, says "the magistracy is
not inferior to that before the Revolution (M. Faguet to the con-
115 1 have cited a number of cases in illustration of this fact in an article
entitled Judicial Control of Administrative and Legislative Acts in France,
9 A ER. POL. Sci. REy. pp. 637 ff.
116The Radical Party sometimes, however, in its annual congresses
adopts resolutions criticizing a particular judge for partiality, or undue
severity, but like similar charges occasionally directed against American
judges they are usually without foundation.
11T See my article on Criminal Procedure in France, 25 YALE LAW JouR-
NAL, p. 266.
"18 De rorganisation judiciaire, p. 12.
"9 Riforme judicidire, p. 43.
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trary notwithstanding) ; if its professional standing has not in-
creased it is more impartial and independent."' 20  The French
magistracy, says M. Cruppi, is enlightened, industrious, sincerely
republican, and its probity has never been suspected.121  In spite
of parsimonious treatment and an unjust mode of recruitment,
our magistracy, says M. Jousserandot, is one of the most
respected, and justly so, of any of Europe. 22 Literary men like
Faguet,' 23 Anatole France,' 2 4 and Eugene Brieux,125 have carica-
tured the system of justice in France, but not eyen they have
reproached the judges for want of integrity and honesty. M.
Brieux puts into the mouth of one of his characters the follow-
ing tribute to the personal integrity of the judges:
"Among all our 4,ooo magistrates there is not one-even among
the poorest and the humblest, who would accept money to modify
his judgment. Here is the glory of the monopoly of the magis-
tracy of our country. We salute it.1126 "When we summarize
the excellencies and the faults of the French magistracy," says
M. Loubat, the distinguished procureur-g~nirale of Lyon, "we
are obliged to recognize that the balance is in its favor. Badly
recruited, badly treated in respect to advancement, poorly paid,
attacked from all sides high and'low, merely defended, it is
profoundly honest and upright. It is the image of the French
spirit, animated by honesty, justice and good sense."'27
JAMES W. GARNER.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.
120 Op. cit., pp. 4-5.
12 1 See his report on the budget of the judiciary for i9oi.
1L22 Op. cit., p. 5.
23 In the two books already cited.
124 La Crainquebille.
125 La Robe Rouge.
1 2 0 Act I, scene 6. He adds, however: "but a great number of them
are ready to make complacencies and capitulations when it involves being
agreeable either to an influential elector, a deputy or a minister who dis-
tributes places or favors. Universal suffrage is the god and the tyrant of
the magistrates."
12 7 Les idies de M. Faguet sur la justice moderne, 72 Ray. PoL. Er
PARL. p. 267.
